TankArchives: 85mm gun vs Tiger I

Introduction

This article will examine the Soviet tests on the Tiger I tank. Or more specifically, how it was portrayed by a spin doctor named TankArchives. This notorious individual has made a career out of interpreting Soviet military reports and memorandums dating from World War 2. He has a long track record of distorting evidence and making dishonest claims, as part of an agenda to change public perception of the Nazi-Soviet war. As per his blog name, he fancys himself as an expert on all things related to armored vehicles. TankArchives also has a major problem with objectivity. When translating these wartime reports, he just can't help but insert his own dialogue into the middle, drawing his own facile conclusions about what was going on. This habit becomes most jarring whenever he translates Soviet reports on German vehicles. TankArchives never hesitates to use this as an opportunity to 'bash' them for 'design flaws.' His antics were the subject of a thorough rebuttal a few months back.

In that instance, he was making biased, incorrect, and subjective interpretations about the kubinka test on the Tiger II. He tried to mislead his audience into thinking the tanks armor was suffering catastrophic failures, when in fact this was simply not the case. TankArchives omitted to show the photographs that depicted what was really going on. He also grossly exaggerated the effects of the hits and marginalised German armor quality. This article is no exception. As before, we'll look at the exact same report as TankArchives and examine whether or not his claims misrepresent it. The format of this article will be somewhat different from the last rebuttal. Previously, we focused solely on the results of the 122mm test, mainly because it was the first weapon used. That approach wouldn't work here, though, because the 85mm was one of the last weapons tested. Therefore, we'll have to do an overview of the other guns that were fired in the trials. This is actually a crucial piece of context that undermines some of TankArchives conclusions about the Tiger I.

The Tiger I after being fired at by the 

85mm S-53 and 122mm A-19 gun

The firing tests, part one

In this part of the trials, the Soviets fire three different weapons against the Tiger tank. The 45mm L46 and 45mm L66 gun guns were tested against the sides, while the 57mm L73 gun was tested against the side turret and front hull. Although the side armor was pierced numerous times, it did not crack at any point. There were no penetrations of the front armor.

45mm L46 gun: Five shots were fired against the side of the turret, from a range of 200 to 500 meters. Two of them penetrated.

45mm L66 gun: Nine shots were fired against the side of the turret and side of the hull, from a range of 100 to 500 meters. Six of them penetrated.

57mm L73 gun: A total of ten shots were fired against the side and front of the hull. Three of them managed to penetrate. We'll examine these in more detail.

-Shot #1 was fired from 800 meters against the hull side: It penetrated.

-Shot #2 was fired from 1000 meters against the cupola: It penetrated.

-Shot #3 and #4 were fired from 1000 meters against the hull side: One shell penetrated, and one shell left a dent.

-Shot # 5, #6, and #7 were fired from 1450 meters against the turret side. None of the shells penetrated, and instead left only dents.

-Shots #8, #9, and #10 were fired from 500 meters against the hull front. None of the shells penetrated, and instead left only dents. A weld seam is also burst.

57mm AP to upper front plate

The firing tests, part two

In this part of the trials, the Soviets fire three different weapons against the Tiger tank, including a British and American gun. The 57mm Mk IV and 75mm M3 gun were tested against the sides, while the 76mm L42 gun was tested against the side turret and the front hull. Although the side armor was pierced numerous times, it did not crack at any point. There were no penetrations of the front armor.

57mm Mk IV gun: Six shots were fired against the side of the turret and side of the hull, from a range of 625 to 1000 meters. Three of the shots penetrated.

75mm M3 gun: Seven shots were fired against the side of the turret and side of the hull, from a range of 400 to 650 meters. Five of the shots penetrated.

76mm L42 gun: A total of eleven shots were fired against the side and front of the hull. Regular AP shells were used, in addition to HVAP shells. Astonishingly, none of them managed to penetrate (!). We'll examine these in more detail.

-Shot #1 and #2 were fired from 650 and 400 meters against the hull side and turret side. Both failed to penetrate.

-Shots #3 and #4 were fired from 200 and 500 meters against the turret side and hull side. Both failed to penetrate.

-Shots #5, #6, and #7 were fired from 500 meters against the hull front. All three failed to penetrate, and left only dents.

-Shots #8 and #9 were fired from 300 and 200 meters against the hull front. Both failed to penetrate.

-Shots #10 and #11 were fired from 400 and 200 meters against the hull side. Both failed to penetrate.

76mm HVAP to upper front plate

The firing tests, part 3

In this part of the trials, the Soviets fire two different weapons against the Tiger tank. The 75mm L55 gun, and the 85mm L55 gun. We've finally gotten to the main event, the entire point of this article. The Tiger I has been quite badly shot up by this point, but has held up quite well to the abuse. This part of the test is when the frontal armor is finally penetrated.

76mm L55 gun: Six shots were fired against the side of the turret and side of the hull, from a range of 500 to 1450 meters. Only one of the shots penetrated.

85mm L55 gun: This is the more interesting part of the trials. A total of six shots were fired at the side of the turret and front of the hull.

-Shot #1 was fired from 800 meters against the turret side: It penetrated.

-Shot #2 and #3 were fired from 1450 meters against the turret side: It penetrated.

-Shot #4 was fired from 1000 meters against the lower front plate: It penetrated.

-Shot #5 was fired from 1500 meters against the upper front plate: It left a large dent, but did not penetrate.

-Shot #6 was fired from 1500 meters against the lower front plate: It hit next to the previous shot and broke a piece of armor loose.

85mm AP to lower front plate

85mm AP to upper front plate

85mm AP to lower front plate

Conclusions about the firing test

So, what can kindof conclusions we take away from the tests? Well to be frank, the methodology of the Soviets is bizarre. They used eight different weapons and fired a total of 60 shots at the Tiger I. * They even used guns from Britain and America, in a test of questionable relevance. They also showed a myopic focus on the side armor. They only tested three weapons against the frontal armor, and two of them (the 76mm guns) proved completely helpless. And yet, that didn't seem to alarm the Soviets at all.

Rather than extensively test their most powerful weapon against this formidable tank, they were content to only fire three shots at the Tigers front! It makes no sense. They didn't even test the armor of the turret face! They merely fired at the upper and lower front plate. One can't help but get the feeling that they had tunnel vision. The Soviets didn't even bother to fire a second shot at the UFP, after the first shot failed. They did that for the LFP, but not the UFP! The entire trial was marked by a lack of curiosity bordering on negligence.

The true effectiveness of the 85mm S53 gun is hard to determine. These tests show that it could penetrate the Tiger Is glacis from 1000 meters. However, subsequent tests showed that it was unable to penetrate the turret face from 400 meters. [1] While the gun was nearly as powerful as the vaunted 88mm L56, it had serious problems with ammunition quality. Wartime Soviet shells did not use armor piercing caps to soften the forces of impact on themselves. The projectiles also had a brittle and soft nose which gave them a bad tendency to shatter against armor at close range. [2] As a result, they had a rather narrow envelope from which they could effectively penetrate.

The cracking of the Tigers LFP is an interesting effect. One of the weld seams had already been burst during the 57mm test. And once the 85mm was fired at it, this was the last straw that broke the plate. The location of the hit was likely a factor, too. Shot #6 not only landed next to shot #4, but it also hit near the edge of the plate. The vulnerability of the LFP became clear in previous tests with the 57mm gun, when the it was suffering greater damage than the UFP. This plate was a definite weakpoint, and was regarded as such by the Germans themselves. Thats why crews would insert pieces of track on top of it, in order to provide extra protection.


TankArchives interpretation

In the previous article, it was noted that TankArchives has a poor grasp of metallurgy and ballistics. He looks upon any instance of brittle behavior in the armor plate and chalks it up to nothing more than low quality. He didn't understand that the kind of ammunition being used will influence how the armor reacts. British, American, and German weapons all used capped shells which defeat armor through ductile hole growth. Soviet weapons used uncapped shells which can only defeat armor through brittle fractures. TankArchives has consistently ignored how differently the test vehicles will perform when fired at by different types of ammunition! **

He trys to frame the 85mm gun as the achilles heel of the Tiger I, just as he framed the 122mm gun as the bane of the Tiger II. But the quality of these two tests are diametrically opposed. One of them is thorough and rigorous, while the other is not. In the 122mm test, there were a total of eleven shots against the front armor: Seven against the glacis, and four against the turret. In the 85mm test, there were a total of three shots against the front armor: Three against the hull, and none against the turret. Its hard to draw many conclusions from this, especially when the results conflict with other tests. [1]

Another thing that must be mentioned is the dishonest manner in which TankArchives presents these tests. At no point in his article does he tell the audience that the Tiger had already been shot at dozens of times by a bunch of different weapons, and had held up to the punishment remarkably well. In fact, its much worse than this: He actually hides the results of some of the trials! He wrote at least five articles covering the tests on the Tiger I, and not one of those articles mention the tests involving the 76mm L42 or 76mm L55 gun. Thats his dirty little secret. The main weapon used on the T-34\76 tank, and the main field gun of the Red Army, was completely useless against the front armor of this tank.

This is a shocking omission that really throws his objectivity into question. When covering these ballistics tests, he only reported on the guns that managed to successfully pierce the tanks armor. In trials where the gun failed to make a significant impression, he simply refused to report on them at all! TankArchives is clearly a biased author who has an agenda of making German tanks look as bad as possible, while making Soviet weapons look better than they really were. His work is marred by dishonesty, exaggeration, and outright lies.



Notes

*And thats not counting the huge 122mm L46 gun used at the very end of the test!

**In the Tiger II tests, the tanks armor stopped acting brittle when it was fired upon by German 75mm and 88mm guns. In the Tiger I tests, the tanks armor stopped acting brittle when it was fired upon by the British 57mm and American 75mm guns. What an astonishing coincidence!


Sources

[1] Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, by Valeriy Zamulin. (Page 433)

[2] World War II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery, by Robert D. Livingston. (Page 11)

No glory in war: the end of WW1

Today marks the 100th year anniversary of the end of world war 1. It was a conflict that did not end in victory for any one nation, but defeat for all. Every country that participated lost more than they gained. Men were sent to war on a lie, giving everything they had in the belief that it was the right thing to do. After the stalemate dragged on for years and became intolerable, backroom deals were worked out to undermine the central powers and force them to surrender. It brought the bloodshed to an end, but only in a way that left everyone worse off than they had before. This indecisive and unsatisfactory end would lay the seeds for another terrible war.

What should we really remember about armistice day?

RE: The 5 Shermans = 1 Panther “myth”

This is yet another response to the war of tanks themed blog, For The Record. The site has a bad habit of posting misleading articles which are full of faulty conclusions. This article is no exception. It attempts to discredit the notion that German tanks such as the Tiger or Panther could achieve significantly higher kill ratios against American tanks like the Sherman. The author in question (Priory of Sion) asserts that technical characteristics and crew training were, in fact, not the determining factor in this. He argues that whichever side spotted the enemy first was the one that held the upper hand, and would obtain the higher kill ratio. Since the attackers had to expose themselves, they were usually spotted by the defenders first. There is certainly some truth to this argument, but he makes the error of assuming that this was the most important factor of all in a tank vs tank engagement. Priory of Sion seems to believe that the Panther tank had some deficiency in fire control that made it inferior to the Sherman. He comes to this conclusion by relying on a single questionable source: The infamous BRL memorandum No. 798. As we shall see, these mistakes will serve to largely invalidate his article.

The classic David vs Goliath battle

Origins of the legend

The post starts out with an examination of the notorious dictum that it took four or five Shermans to defeat one Tiger (or Panther) tank. To be sure, the 'Tiger legend' can be found in the memoirs of many WW2 veterans. The tank had a fearsome reputation all out of proportion to the small numbers that were produced. It gave Allied tankers an inferiority complex about their Shermans, and led to many instances of tank terror among the infantry. Many soldiers eventually came to the conclusion that the only way the lumbering beasts could be defeated was to send an entire platoon after just one tank. The TV show, Greatest Military Clashs, even did an episode on the Tiger myth. Annoyed with all the undeserved praise being heaped on the German 'cats', Priory of Sion decides to track down the origin of the 'five vs one' rumor. His investigation (which probably involved no more than a 5 minute google search) leads him to conclude that the legend originated with Belton Cooper. A veteran of the 3rd armored division, who authored the 1998 book called Death Traps. This memoir is particularly hated by teaboos and freeaboos, due to its unflattering depiction of the Sherman tank. Priory of Sion (who we'll call POS for now) throws the blame for the 'five vs one' legend squarely at the feet of Belton Cooper, and asserts that it is a dictum with little supporting evidence.

In fact, a closer look at the historical records show that the Panther\Tiger myth pre-dates Coopers book by several decades. Even if we assume that it didn't actually originate in the Second World War itself, it must have arisen very soon after. More importantly, the legend was echoed by authors with  higher academic standing than old man Cooper. In Janusz Piekalkiewicz' 1986 book, he states: "According to U.S. Army statistics, it cost five Shermans or some nine T-34s to destroy one Panther." [1] That pushs back the date established by POS by 12 years. In his 1975 book, Bruce Culver claims: ''An unofficial rule of thumb in the U.S. Army was that it took five Shermans to knock out a single Panther.'' [2] That pushs back the date by 23 years. But the real nail in the coffin is when you read the memoirs of Henry Giles, who firmly states that: “It took four of our Shermans to equal one of their Panthers and about eight to equal one of their Tigers.” [3] His book was published in 1965. Thats a full 33 years before Death Traps hit the book shelves. When taking that all into consideration, its becomes clear just how far off the mark POS and his conclusions are. The five to one legend wasn't something that Belton Cooper just pulled out of his ass sometime in the 90s: It was already a well established myth by that point.


Overclaiming by the 3rd and 4th armored

In order to disprove the notion that the Panther was superior to the Sherman, Priory of Sion proceeds to bring out his trump card: BRL memorandum No. 798. The sacred document held in reverence by all freeaboos and teaboos. This report summarises numerous tank engagements on the western front during the 1944 period. To come to their conclusions, the BRL used after-action reports from the 3rd and 4th armored divisions. These were the most successful formations in the U.S. army, and were not really representative of the army as a whole. The 3rd AD entered into combat on July 9, while the 4th AD entered into combat on July 17. When the war was finished, and they turned in their unit diaries, researchers were startled at what they read. The 4th armored claimed to have made 847 tank kills, while the 3rd armored claimed to have made 1023 tank kills! That is a combined total of 1870 kills, a really incredible number that stretchs credibility to the utmost. Because the BRL memorandum is based on these kill claims, it is important to explore whether or not they are realistic. BRL memo no. 798 covers a period of August to December 1944. In the interest of fairness, we should assume that the 3rd and 4th armored scored only half their kills during this time frame.

But even with this generous assumption, the American claims still don't add up with the losses actually recorded by the Germans. They wrote off a total of 4973 AFVs on all fronts, a number that includes 2861 tanks. [4] Those are the losses that were sustained by dozens of panzer and panzergrenadier divisions that were fighting in four different theaters: The eastern front, the western front, the Italian front, and the Balkan front. If the BRL memorandum is correct, then it means that fully 18.8% of their AFV losses in that period (935 tanks) were from these two armored divisions! Thats completely absurd. And just to put things into even starker contrast, consider this. Many of the 4th armored divisions claims were made during the battle of Arracourt. They reported the destruction of at least 285 German tanks and SPGs during the battle. [5] But there is a glaring error with this claim... And that is because the Germans didn't even deploy that many tanks during the battle! They only fielded 262 tanks and SPGs at Arracourt, and of that number, only 86 of them were destroyed beyond repair (I.E., write offs). [6] This shows how idiotic it is to make conclusions based solely on unit diarys. Without further verification, they are completely unreliable and misleading. It is now clear that the U.S. army routinely overclaimed the number of tanks they destroyed.

The first six lines cover Sherman 

vs Panther engagements

Unverified claims by the BRL

Out of the 86 tank engagements recorded by the two armored divisions from August to December, there were 30 encounters between the Sherman and the Panther. In these battles, the Americans lost 21 tanks, while the Germans lost 72 tanks. Thats a loss exchange ratio of 3.4 to 1. The Shermans were on the defense in 20 of these encounters, while the Panthers were on the defense in 10 encounters. There were also 14 engagements between tank destroyers (TDs) and Panthers. In these battles, the Americans lost 3 tank destroyers, while the Germans lost 26 tanks. These facts by themselves should tell us that something is wrong. In the month of September alone, the 4th armored divisions lost 41 Sherman tanks and more than a dozen tank destroyers. [6] Many of these losses came during the battle of Arracourt, when they faced off against waves of unsupported Panthers. This allows us to make a simple conclusion: The BRL was not recording every single engagement that the two divisions participated in. They pre-selected engagements for their study and cherry picked their data. This observation becomes hard to deny once you understand that they studied a total of 86 engagements, in which only 158 enemy weapons (including 105 Panthers) were claimed as killed. In that same period, however, the 3rd and 4th armored divisions probably made half of their 1870 kill claims.

The BRL was using a form of statistical misrepresentation, because they screened out some of the battles these formations participated in. They only looked at those encounters for which there was firm and reliable data. A valid excuse, perhaps, but one that skews the results. The end result is that it paints the U.S. army in a better light, making them look like some real monsters. So when we examine the table for memorandum no. 798, we have to realise that this is not what the typical outcome of a battle was. It doesn't even make sense that the American tanks could have such a massive advantage simply by being on the defensive. POS seems to rationalise this as a result of the Sherman having far better optics than the Panther, but when you look at the respective telescopes, its obvious that this can't be the case. So how do we explain such an absurd disparity in effectiveness between the vehicles? Simply put, we can't. The only sane conclusion to make is that the 3rd and 4th armored divisions were exaggerating their kill claims, and the BRL was cherry picking what battles they studied. For this reason, the memorandum no. 798s claim that the Sherman was x times more effective than the Panther can be dismissed as uncorroborated nonsense.


Sources

[1] Tank War 1939-1945, by Janusz Piekalkiewicz. (Page 254)

[2] Panther in Action, by Bruce Culver. (Page 4)

[3] The G.I. Journal of Sergeant Giles, by Henry Giles.

[4] Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II, by Steven Zaloga. (Page 223)

[5] The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944, by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (Page 17)

[6] Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II, by Steven Zaloga. (Page 192)

No country for white men: South africa

Something terrible happened a few weeks ago. In south africa, the parliament voted to confiscate property from white citizens without compensation. Land that has been passed down from one generation to the next for over 200 years, in some cases. This was part of an agenda to punish them for the sins of their colonist ancestors, and to appease the angry blacks who make up most of the population. The greed factor is undeniable, too. With this policy, the bureaucrats can acquire prime real estate for pennys on the pound. The black south africans have taken the racist sentiments of its government as free license to persecute the whites. Street violence has increased, and so has mob attacks on farms. This is not a new trend: Its been going on ever since Nelson Mandela took office in 1994. His presidency proved to be a disaster for the country, which has become poorer and poorer over time, while violence has skyrocketed. According to one estimate, there were over 445,000 murders between april 1994 and march 2016.

 Mobs of angry blacks

The annual murder rate certainly hasn't abated since then, as the government seeks to maintain its popularity by engaging in more and more flagrant acts of discrimination against the white minority. These absurdly unfair land grabs will leave the people destitute and vulnerable. Its entirely possible that this scenario could morph into full on genocide. The people are stripped of their rights more and more every year, and are in fear for their lives. If a wave of mass murders sweeps the country, then the white south africans have limited options to flee. Tragically, most western nations will refuse to accept them as refugees. This is due largely to self imposed political correctness, and the belief that only 'dark skinned peoples' can be the victims of racism and prejudice. European liberals would much rather virtue signal to each other, and continue bringing in muslims by the boat and plane load. The only 1st world country that seems ready to accept them as refugees is australia.

Refugee crisis: Germany

Ever since angela merkel opened germanys borders to hundreds of thousands of muslim refugees in 2015, the political elites and corporate media have been doing their best to stifle all criticism of this policy, and conceal the negative consequences from the public. This pattern has been observed in numerous european countrys affected by the migrant crisis. (Sweden was the worst offender of this, with their special '291' code used to cover up crimes by refugees) But the costs of multi culturalism are proving so onerous that the mainstream german media can't keep it under wraps any more. Its now admitted that crimes rates have increased significantly with the arrival of the third worlders. Constant fights, muggings, beatings, and unruliness have turned some areas into no-go-zones. Sexual assaults and rapes have increased so much that german women are now buying anti-rape pants, and are trying to raise awareness about their peril. Unfortunately, theres not very much that the average man can do about it.
 
The CDU and other partys are ardent opponents of nationalism, and don't want people interfering with their multi-cultural agenda. If a white german were to beat up a dark skinned muslim, then he would no doubt be crucified by the leftist run media, and charged with fictitious 'hate crimes'. Political elites are purposely ignoring the problems that arise when introducing millions of people into a country with a different race, religion, and culture. And in fact, they are inflaming those problems by telling the public that they must submit to the foreigners! Television networks seem to be in cohoots with them, by running propaganda that normalises islam. This is very problematic in a country like germany, because the people are more gullible by nature, and have few tools to attack authority figures with. Their criticisms can easily be shut down with ad hominem attacks like 'racist' or 'conspiracy theorist.' The overton window is extremely narrow in that country, largely due to the efforts of the leftist bullys who run the show.

 The Mass Brainwashing of Germany

 German women rise up! #120

This all lends a rather depressing view of the future, but there have been some positive developments as of late. The far right AfD party got a huge boost in the elections last year, and is trying to fight back against the islamisation of europe. These election gains caused leftists to lose faith in merkel, who spent months vainly trying to form a coalition government. She was (correctly) blamed for the victorys of the far right, and there were even calls for her to step down. The trecherous leader barely managed to avert disaster when the SPD kooks offered her a coalition deal. With no rest for the wicked, though, merkel then attended a conference where she was subjected to a barrage of criticism by the austrian chancellor. Sebastian kurz told her flat out that his country is under no obligation to accept refugees from the third world, and is firmly supportive of the czech, hungarian, and polish decision to opt out of any migrant quotas. Without question, european nationalism is on the rise again. What was once controversial before the migrant crisis of 2015, is now snowballing into a trend. Huge demonstrations were held in greece last month, embarrassing its 'progressive' government. They tried to censor the event from the media, but to little effect. Some of the demonstrators used the event to settle a score with antifa, by torching a building that belonged to one of their chapters.

TankArchives: 122mm gun vs Tiger II

Introduction

This article will examine the Soviet tests on the Tiger II tank. Or more specifically, how it was portrayed by a spin doctor named TankArchives. This notorious individual has made a career out of interpreting Soviet military reports and memorandums dating from world war 2. He has a long track record of distorting evidence and making dishonest claims, as part of an agenda to change public perception of the Nazi-Soviet war. As per his blog name, he fancys himself as an expert on all things related to armored vehicles. TankArchives also has a major problem with objectivity. When translating these wartime reports, he just can't help but insert his own dialogue into the middle, drawing his own facile conclusions about what was going on. This habit becomes most jarring whenever he translates Soviet reports on German vehicles. TankArchives never hesitates to use this as an opportunity to 'bash' them for 'design flaws.'

The Soviet tests were conducted at kubinka, in November 1944. The temperatures on that day were -10 celsius, which may have adversely effected the ductility of the armor. This must be kept in mind when examining how the armor reacted to these strikes. In this article, we'll look at the exact same report as TankArchives and examine whether or not his claims misrepresent it. We'll also look at some photographs that were provided in the report and make conclusions based on what they show. This will provide a contrast to the one sided reporting of TankArchives. An example of this is how, at the start of his article, he throws objectivity out the window and presents a picture of the Tiger II tank from after the trials were over... After it had been fired on by 122mm, 100mm, 152mm, and 85mm guns. An intelligent and objective reader immediately gets put off by this.

The Tiger II after being fired at by the 
122mm A-19 and 100mm BS-3 gun

Specifications of the armor and gun

The Tiger II was without a doubt the best armored tank of the second world war, the culmination in a long line of progressively heavier 'breakthrough tanks.' Its frontal armor is especially impressive. The upper front plate (UFP) is 150mm thick and sloped at 50 degrees from the vertical. The lower front plate (LFP) is 100mm thick and sloped at 55 degrees. The turret face is 180mm thick and sloped at 10 degrees. We can use this information to determine what the line of sight (LOS) thickness of these armor plates were. The Tigers upper front plate had an LOS thickness of 233mm, while the lower front plate had an LOS thickness of 174mm.

The 122mm gun came in two different models, the A-19 which has an L/46 barrel, and the D-25T which has an L/43 barrel. The former was a field gun, the latter was used by tanks and assault guns. The A-19 model had slightly higher performance, and was the variant used in this test. According to the 50% criteria, it could pierce 212mm of armor at 100 meters, 200mm at 500 meters, and 182mm at 1000 meters. [1] This was when using the BR-471B shell, which had a ballistic cap (basically, a windscreen that improved its aerodynamics). The regular BR-471 shell had no cap, and somewhat lower penetration.


The firing tests, part one

In this test, five shots are directed against the upper front plate (UFP).

Shot #1 is an HE shell against the UFP, from 100 meters. The only damage is a shallow scuff mark, and burst weld seams. There was some spalling as well. TankArchives crows about the results, saying the shell has literally torn the tank apart. Which is utter nonsense, as the glacis itself is clearly still intact.

Shot #2 is an AP shell against the UFP, from 2700 meters. The impact left a shallow scuff mark, but did no damage. TankArchives is disappointed by the result and has little to say.

Shot #3 is an AP shell against the UFP, from 500 meters. The impact left a deep scuff mark and caused spalling. TankArchives crows about the results, lecturing about the perils of 'overhardened armor.'

Shot #4 is an APBC shell against the UFP, from 600 meters. The impact actually makes a clean penetration. TankArchives crows about the results, saying the 'low quality' of the armor has let the crew down.

Shot #5 is an APBC shell against the UFP, from 700 meters. The only damage is a shallow scuff mark, and burst weld seams. TankArchives crows about the results, lecturing about the perils of 'overhardened armor.'


Whats interesting about the original five shots against the glacis plate is that only one of them (shot #4) actually managed to penetrate. All the others failed to do so and only caused secondary damage through spalling or whatnot. Shot #4 and #5 used a brand-new APBC shell, called the BR-471B, which has superior performance to regular AP. And yet, there are oddities in the results that TankArchives pays no heed to.

Does he notice that while shot #3 pierces the armor, the shell doesn't actually pass into the tank? Nope. Does he notice that the 100 meter range difference between shot #3 and #4 was enough to render the APBC shells ineffective? Nope. Hes is clueless and ignorant as ever. Despite claims to the contrary, it seems that the Tiger IIs glacis plate is actually very tough, and holding up quite well to the abuse.

Also, do you see the boisterous manner in which TankArchives reports on these firing tests? He isn't conveying them in an impartial or unbiased tone. Hes literally cheering from the sidelines like a drunken football fan, ranting about the 'inferior' German tanks and their 'brittle' armor. And he wonders why people don't take him seriously, or dismiss his work as propaganda? It would be funny if it wasn't so ridiculous.

Shot #1

Shot #2

Shot #3

Shot #4

Shot #5

    
The firing tests, part two

In this test, two shots are against the lower front plate (LFP), and two are against the turret face.

Shot #6 is an AP shell against the LFP, from 2500 meters. The impact left a shallow scuff mark, but did no damage. TankArchives is disappointed by the result and has little to say.

Shot #7 is an AP shell against the LFP, from 600 meters. The impact left a shallow scuff mark, but did no damage. TankArchives is disappointed by the result and has little to say.

(After this, there is a big gap, as the Soviet testers switched to other guns and fired at the tank. They used 100mm, 152mm, and 85mm guns. Testing then resumes with the 122mm against the Tiger IIs turret, which is already damaged from prior impacts)

Shot #34 is an AP shell against the turret face, from 2500 meters. The shell hit next to a previous shot and knocked a piece of armor loose. TankArchives crows about the results, lecturing about the perils of 'overhardened armor.'

Shot #35 is an AP shell against the turret face, from 3400 meters. The shell cracked the armor, but otherwise did no damage. TankArchives is disappointed by the result and has little to say.


In this firing sequence as well, there are certain oddities. The 122mm gun actually made four shots against the turret face (#32, #33, #34, #35), but TankArchives chooses to only report on two of them (#34, #35). Who knows what his reason for doing this are? The true value of this sequence is questionable, anyway, since the turret has already been damaged by previous shots.


Conclusions about the firing tests

So, what can kindof conclusions we take away from the kubinka tests with the 122mm gun on the Tiger II? First, the regular HE and AP shells cannot pierce the glacis plate, they can only cause spalling or whatnot. Second, the brand-new APBC shells can only pierce the glacis plate from relatively short range (600 meters and under). Third, all the shells mentioned will perform better against the thinner armor of the turret face.

The 122mm A-19 struggles to defeat this beast of a tank, and its literally the best gun in the entire Soviet arsenal! Its performance is actually quite comparable to the 88mm kwk 43 gun used by the Tiger II itself. We can measure their power by using the 50 percent criteria. When firing APBC shells, the 122mm could pierce 212mm of armor at 100 meters. [1] When firing APCBC shells, the 88mm could pierce 232mm of armor at 100 meters. [2] This was against an unsloped armor plate.

But when tested against an armor plate sloped at 50 degrees, the results are quite different. At 100 meters distance, the 88mm APCBC can only pierce 106mm of armor, while the 122mm APBC can only pierce 120mm of armor. For some reason, the Soviet shell performs better against highly sloped armor than the German shell. This is likely due to the T\D ratio, the thickness of the plate compared to the diameter of the shell.

As for the behavior of the armor plates themselves. The fact that they suffered from spalling and burst weld seems is not completely surprising, given the size of the impacting shells. Another factor is that Soviet ammunition did not use an armor piercing cap to soften the forces of impact on themselves. [3] For this reason, they can usually achieve penetration only by exceeding the shear strength of the plate itself. They defeat armor by brittle fractures, rather than ductile hole growth.

The damage caused by uncapped vs capped 
ammunition is starkly apparent in this image

TankArchives interpretation

There are a number of problems that loom over all the articles written by TankArchives. One of them is that he is clueless about metallurgy and ballistics. He seems to labor under the delusion that any time the armor doesn't reject the shell with zero damage to itself, that this is somehow indicative of low quality! This is complete nonsense because even high quality armor can fail when subjected to powerful enough attack. He doesn't understand that just because the armor suffers a brittle fracture doesn't automatically mean that its defective.

Another thing that escapes his notice is how differently the Tiger IIs armor behaves when attacked by German and Soviet shells. In addition to the 152mm, 122mm, 100mm, and 85mm guns, the kubinka tests also featured the 88mm and 75mm guns. When fired on by the latter two weapons, the 'brittle' plates suddenly don't act brittle. They experience ductile failure modes, because they are being hit with capped ammunition. TankArchives has complete tunnel vision: He cannot fathom the idea that the impacting shell also influences how the plate behaves!

Another problem is the tone in which he interprets these test results. It is clearly done in the style of someone who is an ultra-nationalist and historical revisionist: Someone who has no interest whatsoever in impartiality. TankArchives comments are reminiscent of the dialogue box in God of War, when you score points from racking up combos. "Vicious!" "Sadistic!" "Savage!"; "Inhuman!"; "Bloodthirsty!"; "Relentless!"; "Merciless!" He isn't even analysing the results, hes just turned himself into a human laugh track.

He presents his claims in such an absurd manner that an intelligent and objective readers simply shake their head in disgust and stops reading... Which leaves only the unintelligent or subjective readers remaining. Exactly the kindof audience TankArchives wants! Its a brilliant example of nigerian phishing. As wikipedia points out in this article: "By sending an email that repels all but the most gullible, the scammer gets the most promising marks to self-select." You have to give him credit for that, at least: He knows the market.

The laugh track

Sources

[1] World War II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery, by Robert D. Livingston. (Page 50)

[2] World War II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery, by Robert D. Livingston. (Page 61)

[3] Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual - Volume 14, by David R. Jones. (Page 260)